Dr. Paul André is Senior Lecturer in Financial Management at the University of Edinburgh since 2004 and associate professor of financial accounting at HEC Montréal since August 1997. He has also been professor of financial accounting at the University of Ottawa and l'Université du Québec à Montréal. His areas of expertise include financial statement analysis, financial performance measures, mergers and acquisitions and market reactions to financial information. Graduated from the University of Waterloo (Ontario) in 1996 with a Ph.D. in financial accounting and finance, Dr. André has been active in numerous research projects and in the development of financial statement analysis seminars for MSc, MBA and CFA candidates and of tailored training seminars in finance and accounting for various organisations. Chartered Accountant (CA) since 1986, he worked for one of the big international accounting firms, Ernst & Young, in Ottawa and Melbourne (Australia). Dr. André has been a visiting professor at the Université de Paris-Dauphine, Université de Paris-Créteil, Concordia University and ISCAE Tunis. He is also an active member of the Research Alliance in Governance and Forensic Accounting funded within the Initiative on the new economy program of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).

Abstract:
This paper provides empirical evidence on the relation between concentrated ownership and the long term operating performance of acquiring firms. We investigate the performance around 287 takeovers in English-origin countries other than the US by following the classification of La Porta et al. (1998). Our principal finding is that the relationship between concentrated ownership and the level and change in operating cash flow returns after takeovers is non-linear. Value creating deals are associated with higher levels of concentration consistent with decreasing agency costs as the dominant shareholder’s wealth invested in the acquiring firm increases. We also find, although all acquiring firms are from English-origin countries, that greater investor protection, as measured by the updated anti-director rights index in Djankov et al (2006), has a positive impact on operating performance from acquisitions. We do not find a link between performance and their new anti-self-dealing index.